…For Kant, theology, law, faculty, this is private use of reason. Because you know, you have a certain frame determined in advance. For Kant, philosophy and pure science are public use of reason. So it's a wonderful idea. If a couple of us meet in a…

…in a way impossible, prohibited. What do I mean by this? I was always fascinated by this idea that the real, what Immanuel Kant calls, thing in itself. It's not so much some mystery out there. It's something that simply we are prohibited to see in order…

…is cognition, right? Unless you're saying that thinking is not. We philosophers like to complicate things here, you know. For Kant already, thinking is not the same as cognition. Cognition is cognition of phenomenal reality and so on. Thinking, you know,…

…now in the strict sense. Because thinking is for me something much more intricate. I think that first, and it's already clear with Kant, The origin of thinking is always a failure. The ultimate act of thinking is that you try to account for your failure.…

…is always a failure. The ultimate act of thinking is that you try to account for your failure. Where does thinking for Kant emerge? Why for Kant, for example, thinking is not cognition? Sorry, cognition. Because cognition means I try to get knowledge of…

…The ultimate act of thinking is that you try to account for your failure. Where does thinking for Kant emerge? Why for Kant, for example, thinking is not cognition? Sorry, cognition. Because cognition means I try to get knowledge of objects and so on.…

…assimilate the object into the subject. in some way. And so this starts with authors like Maimon and Fichte, the ones immediately after Kant, where Kant said there is a thing in itself out there that we can think about but we can never know. These…

…object into the subject. in some way. And so this starts with authors like Maimon and Fichte, the ones immediately after Kant, where Kant said there is a thing in itself out there that we can think about but we can never know. These critiques of Kant…

…Kant said there is a thing in itself out there that we can think about but we can never know. These critiques of Kant tended to say that that itself is a performative contradiction, because if you're thinking a thing outside thought, that itself is a…

…science be the dominant discourse. And what Slavoy tells us in a number of his publications is that the way Hegel radicalized Kant by getting rid of the thing in itself is also the way that Lacan radicalized Freud. So that the unconscious in Freud…

…There's not really a hidden place where the unconscious is. Now, what I would say is that modern, sorry, neo-modern philosophy radicalizes Kant in the wrong way. It tends to say that the problem with Kant, this great genius, is the allowed for finitude,…

…would say is that modern, sorry, neo-modern philosophy radicalizes Kant in the wrong way. It tends to say that the problem with Kant, this great genius, is the allowed for finitude, this idea that humans cannot reach the thing in itself because we are…

…of this finitude, which they distrust. I would go the other way. I think the finitude is insurmountable. I think the problem with Kant is that he left the human world relation at the center of philosophy, and it's the only real relation he can talk…

…is that he left the human world relation at the center of philosophy, and it's the only real relation he can talk about. Kant doesn't really allow you to talk about the collision of two inanimate entities, except insofar as we are talking about it, and…

…therefore the conditions of human experience apply to discussing that. So I think what should have happened is people should have said, Kant is a genius precisely because of the finitude, he just shouldn't have reduced it to the human world gap, so that…

…example, as an old Plato admirer, I claim it's clear how Aristotle... misread Plato, or to go later, it's clear that Kant misread Leibniz and the previous philosophers. Fichte, Schelling misread Kant, Hegel misread all of them. My favorite example. If any…

…how Aristotle... misread Plato, or to go later, it's clear that Kant misread Leibniz and the previous philosophers. Fichte, Schelling misread Kant, Hegel misread all of them. My favorite example. If any guy didn't understand Hegel, it was Marx, and so on…

…there. It's not here. And that's why Fried hates theatrical aesthetics. Anything theatrical is bad. And in formal ethics, of course, in Kant, I think it's the only place he uses the term formalism, is in his ethics, not in the other parts. And formalism…

…work in any object. And where I would disagree with the classical formalists in various fields is simply, as I already said about Kant, that Kant tries to separate the subject and the object in all this formalism so that there's ethics is all here, art…

…any object. And where I would disagree with the classical formalists in various fields is simply, as I already said about Kant, that Kant tries to separate the subject and the object in all this formalism so that there's ethics is all here, art is all…

…deficit of global capitalism would have been through some kind of transnational entity. It was already Emmanuel, not this one, but Kant, Emmanuel Kant, who more than 200 years ago saw the need for a transnational state, a transnational legal order grounded…

…global capitalism would have been through some kind of transnational entity. It was already Emmanuel, not this one, but Kant, Emmanuel Kant, who more than 200 years ago saw the need for a transnational state, a transnational legal order grounded in the rise…

…years ago saw the need for a transnational state, a transnational legal order grounded in the rise of global society. A quote from Kant. Since the narrower or wider community of the people of the earth has developed so that a violation of rights in one…

…the point is precisely that, no, this is the end of thinking. This is not what we are doing. This is exactly what Kant called private use of reason, where it's subordinated to a goal. What Kant calls public use of reason means questioning the goals…

…is not what we are doing. This is exactly what Kant called private use of reason, where it's subordinated to a goal. What Kant calls public use of reason means questioning the goals themselves. Like, is this a true problem? Do we perceive the problem in…

…a form of sexuality, of the impossibility of the sexual relationship. So, how do I... What do I mean by this? Let's begin with Kant, from Kant to Hegel. Why is for Lacan Kant at the beginning of it all? I'm of course here relying on the path-breaking…

…sexuality, of the impossibility of the sexual relationship. So, how do I... What do I mean by this? Let's begin with Kant, from Kant to Hegel. Why is for Lacan Kant at the beginning of it all? I'm of course here relying on the path-breaking study, and…

…relationship. So, how do I... What do I mean by this? Let's begin with Kant, from Kant to Hegel. Why is for Lacan Kant at the beginning of it all? I'm of course here relying on the path-breaking study, and it's very strange how totally ignored it…

…is for me one of the absolute great texts, is ignored. So let me try to develop this. In the predominant perception, Kant is perceived as someone who openly admitted the failure of general ontology, an ontology which aims at grasping the whole of reality.…

…ontology which aims at grasping the whole of reality. This is Kant's big revolution. You know, if you know a little bit of Kant, we don't have time to go into details now, Kant's basic hypothesis is that, axiom even, that when our mind tries to grasp…

…we see here, from what we can test, how all of reality is structured, We not only fail, but we get caught into what Kant calls antinomies. And there is no primitive Hegelian dialectics in it. It's not that it's this and that, let's do a synthesis. For…

…antinomies. And there is no primitive Hegelian dialectics in it. It's not that it's this and that, let's do a synthesis. For Kant, these are radical antinomies in the sense of, like, is there a free will or... is all of reality totally determined by…

…that's behind what I perceive as philosophical relevance of psychoanalysis. So we have this Kantian situation, antinomies. Kant distinguishes two types of antinomies, so-called mathematical antinomies, which are the antinomies of... of quantitative antinomies when…

…not afraid, sorry, was not aware of it, exactly fit Lacan's formulas of sexuation. In other words, what are, for Kant, mathematical antinomies, all or non-all, are structured like what Lacan calls the deadlock antagonism of feminine sexuality, what Kant calls…

…mathematical antinomies, all or non-all, are structured like what Lacan calls the deadlock antagonism of feminine sexuality, what Kant calls dynamic antinomies, which are structured exactly like what Lacan calls masculine antagonism, which is universality and its…

…and so on, and so on. So, that's again, that's the big breakthrough of John Kobjek. Just to establish this link, that Kant was struggling for years, if you look to seminars which come before ANCOR, before the 20, he was struggling for years trying…

…there is a chapter of antinomies of pure sexuation, because this is what Lacan is doing. Okay, so what's then the problem with Kant? Here I think what is crucial is to accomplish a passage from Kant to Hegel. Because Kant, for Kant, the ultimate deadlock…

…doing. Okay, so what's then the problem with Kant? Here I think what is crucial is to accomplish a passage from Kant to Hegel. Because Kant, for Kant, the ultimate deadlock is an epistemological one concerning knowledge. Antinomies are for Kant just…

…then the problem with Kant? Here I think what is crucial is to accomplish a passage from Kant to Hegel. Because Kant, for Kant, the ultimate deadlock is an epistemological one concerning knowledge. Antinomies are for Kant just antinomies of our knowledge.…

…problem with Kant? Here I think what is crucial is to accomplish a passage from Kant to Hegel. Because Kant, for Kant, the ultimate deadlock is an epistemological one concerning knowledge. Antinomies are for Kant just antinomies of our knowledge. Kant posits…

…from Kant to Hegel. Because Kant, for Kant, the ultimate deadlock is an epistemological one concerning knowledge. Antinomies are for Kant just antinomies of our knowledge. Kant posits a reality in itself which cannot be antinomic. Things are what they are…

…Kant, for Kant, the ultimate deadlock is an epistemological one concerning knowledge. Antinomies are for Kant just antinomies of our knowledge. Kant posits a reality in itself which cannot be antinomic. Things are what they are out there, but we cannot get…

…try to understand all of it, we get, with our limited human mind, we get necessarily caught into antinomies. Which is for Kant a proof that reality is unknowable to us. And things get here with regard to ethics incredibly interesting. Because then Kant…

…is for Kant a proof that reality is unknowable to us. And things get here with regard to ethics incredibly interesting. Because then Kant asks the question, I often quote this passage, he asks the question, my God, how time is running, I hate life, he…

…God create the world in such a stupid way that we cannot get to know external reality the way it really is. And Kant gives an extremely radical interesting answer for ethical reasons. If we were to be able to know how reality really is, ethics would…

…have been possible. Because we would simply know how things are, and if there is God, we would act ethically, but not really. Because for Kant, as you know, a real ethical act is when you do it just for the sake of duty. But if we were to know…

…I know I will be punished. So, again, but let's go a step further here, to see all the shocking dimensions. So Kant remains antinomous at the epistemological level. As Hegel puts it so nicely, Kant shows too much tenderness for the things, for reality.…

…further here, to see all the shocking dimensions. So Kant remains antinomous at the epistemological level. As Hegel puts it so nicely, Kant shows too much tenderness for the things, for reality. If there is an antinomy, it means... We don't know how things…

…in the sense that it doesn't fit reality, that we are unable to understand the way things really are. Now, the greatness of Kant here, he is very radical, is that for him this is not just a limitation of certain class, epoch, whatever, but antinomies…

…here, he is very radical, is that for him this is not just a limitation of certain class, epoch, whatever, but antinomies are for Kant constitutive of human reason as such. Now, The move from Kant to Hegel is a very radical one. It's not a return to…

…not just a limitation of certain class, epoch, whatever, but antinomies are for Kant constitutive of human reason as such. Now, The move from Kant to Hegel is a very radical one. It's not a return to naive ontology like no, no, we can get to know the…

…with really the very focus of what I'm trying to do. Hegel's move is not simply to claim, no, we can move over Kant and no reality. Hegel's claim is much more radical one. It's that the antinomy which for Kant, in Kant's view, prevents our contact…

…to claim, no, we can move over Kant and no reality. Hegel's claim is much more radical one. It's that the antinomy which for Kant, in Kant's view, prevents our contact with reality is the very point where we can touch the real outside. Let me give you…

…and impenetrable objectivity is the fundamental, real feature of society today. This is the proper, how to put it, step from Kant to Hegel. Hegel does not resolve Kantian antinomies. There is no step further into a higher dialectical synthesis or whatever.…

…for Lacan, in this sense, Sexual antagonism is the privileged way to get at this, therein resides, as you can see in Kant again, the ontological consequence of sexual antagonism. Sexuality is not just a distortion of us sexed beings, but a signal, an…

…with Lacan's terminology, when he says, I raise myself against philosophy. Well, fuck you, all the philosophy is doing this from Kant onwards, you know. Like, Kant already... refuses for what he is doing the term philosophy. He says it's just prolegomena,…

…I raise myself against philosophy. Well, fuck you, all the philosophy is doing this from Kant onwards, you know. Like, Kant already... refuses for what he is doing the term philosophy. He says it's just prolegomena, transcendental preparation of philosophy.…

…Schelling, in the same way. Hegel, he said it's not philosophy, it's Wissenschaft, it's knowledge. Marx, Nietzsche, no philosopher after Kant wants to be a philosopher, except this new ontology, new materialism now and so on. It's quite incredible how…

…Kant wants to be a philosopher, except this new ontology, new materialism now and so on. It's quite incredible how philosophy after Kant, inclusive of Kant, is defined as anti-philosophy. In no way can you take Hegel as a positive ontologist. Hegel is not…

…philosopher, except this new ontology, new materialism now and so on. It's quite incredible how philosophy after Kant, inclusive of Kant, is defined as anti-philosophy. In no way can you take Hegel as a positive ontologist. Hegel is not an ultra-rationalist…

…history of modern rationalist philosophy, maybe even before, but beginning at least with Descartes and going through thinkers like Kant, Hegel, Marx, and others, a fundamental problematization of misleading and inconsistent notions of freedom. And the one that…

…can find this not only in Descartes, but also, for example, in the very beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant... explicitly states that reason is a peculiar entity because on one side it cannot but behave like a small little child…

…small little child constantly asking why why why and is never satisfied with whatever answer it gets and is thereby driven into what Kant calls the realm of principles but that it is driven into this realm shows for Kant and you can find this literally…

…it gets and is thereby driven into what Kant calls the realm of principles but that it is driven into this realm shows for Kant and you can find this literally I think on page two of the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason,…

…and thus cannot be satisfied with the idea that things could be either way, A or non-A, etc. This is to say that Kant starts this whole project against what he refers to, also page 2, preface, critique of pure reason, as the indifferentists who claim…

…a fuck about God, the order of the world, freedom, and all these difficult questions. that we cannot answer anyhow. So Kant starts his whole project by trying to reject the idea that rational creatures could be defined by something that is indifferent,…

…that briefly, by many readers, namely that all great modern thinkers of freedom, and in the book I discuss Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Freud, with a short prehistory concerning Luther, but Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Freud are not only attempting to…

…of freedom, and in the book I discuss Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Freud, with a short prehistory concerning Luther, but Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Freud are not only attempting to unfold a specific concept of freedom, but they all somehow defend something…

…as if Lacan, as if he didn't read Lacan. Lacan's whole point is that. And Lacan says this emphatically. For example, debating Kant. Lacan says, my real has nothing to do with this Kantian thing in itself, some entity, pure real, out of law. Lacanian…

…It's kind of easy critique, but all pressures connected with it. It's very precise and can be put in the terms of Immanuel Kant when he opposes public use of reason, I think the German term is oftenly Gebrauch, and private use of reason. You know the…

…opposes public use of reason, I think the German term is oftenly Gebrauch, and private use of reason. You know the paradox. For Kant, public use of reason is not a working for the state, for community. This is for Kant precisely private use of reason.…

…reason. You know the paradox. For Kant, public use of reason is not a working for the state, for community. This is for Kant precisely private use of reason. When your Reason is in advance limited by tasks, problems decided by others. While in public use…

…self-destructive. It's not... civilizations, symbolic fictions, duties. But it's also not nature. You know who was nicely aware of this? Immanuel Kant. In a tiny text which is half forgotten today on education. It's there that Kant says this weird thing that…

…know who was nicely aware of this? Immanuel Kant. In a tiny text which is half forgotten today on education. It's there that Kant says this weird thing that I like. Famous definition of what is man. Man is an animal who needs an answer. Sorry, mystical…

…Lacanian one, I think. The living death. And here, sorry, to make this short philosophical exercise, in Immanuel Kant, you find an absolutely crucial philosophical distinction. The distinction between negative and infinite or indefinite judgments. A negative…

…crucial philosophical distinction. The distinction between negative and infinite or indefinite judgments. A negative judgment negates a predicate. What Kant calls infinite judgment asserts a non-predicate. Now you will tell me, but fuck it, it's the same shit.…

…In short, Poe's Imp of the Perverse corresponds to the point of freedom in the strict Kantian sense. This reference to Kant is far from accidental. According to Kant, the faculty of desiring does not possess a transcendental status, since it depends wholly…

…to the point of freedom in the strict Kantian sense. This reference to Kant is far from accidental. According to Kant, the faculty of desiring does not possess a transcendental status, since it depends wholly upon pathological objects and motivations,…

…any empirical contingent object. That is to say, I accomplish what is strictly a non-pathological act. Here then I think Kant miscalculated his wager. By cleansing the domain of ethics of all pathological motivations, Kant of course wanted to extirpate the…

…a non-pathological act. Here then I think Kant miscalculated his wager. By cleansing the domain of ethics of all pathological motivations, Kant of course wanted to extirpate the very possibility of doing evil in the guise of good. What he actually did was…

…the theoretical theater staged by Althusser. This repressed sequence concerns precisely a guilt feeling, but, and we are back at Kant now, a guilt feeling of a purely formal, non-pathological, in the Kantian sense again, non-pathological nature, a guilt that,…

…our struggle should focus on those aspects which pose a threat to general intellect, to this transnational open space, to what ultimately Kant already called the public use of reason. Today, I will designate to you so that you will not tell what should we…

…reduction of high education to the task of producing socially useful expert knowledge is the paradigmatic form of, again, what Kant called private use of reason in today's global capitalism. For example, the ruling ideology perceives a problem. Poor, idiotic,…

…our struggle should focus on those aspects which pose a threat to general intellect, to this transnational open space, to what ultimately Kant already called the public use of reason. Today, I will designate to you so that you will not tell what should we…

…reduction of high education to the task of producing socially useful expert knowledge is the paradigmatic form of, again, what Kant called private use of reason in today's global capitalism. For example, the ruling ideology perceives a problem. Poor, idiotic,…

…radical philosophical consequences it ruins traditional ontology and so on and so on which is why Lacan is very precise in his Kant with Saab at the beginning when he asks where in the history of ideas does the movement which began which culminates in…

…asks where in the history of ideas does the movement which began which culminates in Freud, where does it begin? He says Kant. And also, I have a problem with this, but Lacan was an anti-philosopher. But listen, all philosophers from Kant onwards were…

…He says Kant. And also, I have a problem with this, but Lacan was an anti-philosopher. But listen, all philosophers from Kant onwards were anti-philosophers, in the sense of none of them wanted to be called a philosopher. Kant says prolegomena, not yet…

…all philosophers from Kant onwards were anti-philosophers, in the sense of none of them wanted to be called a philosopher. Kant says prolegomena, not yet philosophy, preparation. Fichte said Wissenschaftlehre. So is there a gap? Would you agree? Yeah, but…

…targeting the very core of philosophy, psychoanalysis is in a way more philosophical than philosophy, it brings out what, and this happens with Kant and so on, so you know what, so that we don't lose time now, why don't I begin with this tomorrow, I…

…lose time now, why don't I begin with this tomorrow, I promise you, because I have the entire line, because then we go to Kant, Hegel and so on, ok. the lady with spectacles i wanted to bring you together you have a beard you have spectacles together…

…Okay, but it's a nice kid, because it's still very small, you know. I claim that kids between four and five are what Kant meant by diabolical evil. Okay. Before they are simple egotists and later, but kids between four and five are pure evil for the…

…extensa, res cogitans, he limits this mechanical rational reasoning to nature and reserves a space for God or for the spiritual domain. Kant does the same. On the one hand, as Lacan and others have long ago noted, Kant's problem is to elaborate a…

…have long ago noted, Kant's problem is to elaborate a philosophy at the level of Newtonian physics. But the whole problem of Kant is how to, and that's the notion of Kant's critique, not critique in the sense of rejection, but critique in the sense…

…limited domain where science is valid, and of course then a separate domain where faith, morality and so on have their own place. Kant at some point typically openly says that I had to limit the scope of knowledge to sustain the space of faith. I think…

…is that against this predominant idealist form of philosophy, For Althusser, Disser, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Althusser asserts then the subterranean tradition of materialist counter-philosophy from early Greek materialists and epicureans…

…have the ethics of the supreme good referring to some top of highest point of reality, and so on. The point is, did Kant effectively achieve this, or is his philosophical edifice a compromise? As I already pointed out, Kant openly claims that his goal is…

…so on. The point is, did Kant effectively achieve this, or is his philosophical edifice a compromise? As I already pointed out, Kant openly claims that his goal is to limit knowledge in order to make space for belief. And I claim the modern neo-Kantians,…

…philosophy. You know, I've repeated this often. This is even, I claim, the key to the notion of subjectivity. You know, Kant distinguishes between negative and infinite judgment. A negative judgment simply denies a predicate. Like, I am not dead. I negate a…

…at all the same thing. Because... I am not dead remains within this opposition of dead alive. But I am undead. That's why Kant calls it infinite. Judgment opens up a third domain of living dead. Undead means as dead you are alive. Undead doesn't negate…

…that would be my point subject is simply devoid of decenterness and even literally you find this in some way already in Kant, because the whole identity of the Kantian subject of pure apperception is that you are radically forever decentered from what you…

…Kantian subject of pure apperception is that you are radically forever decentered from what you are as the thing in itself. And Kant openly approaches this problem in that mysterious part that I often quote, the very finale of its very short second part…

…in that mysterious part that I often quote, the very finale of its very short second part of Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant asks the obvious question, but why are we limited only to phenomenal domain? Why can't we get to know things in themselves?…

…Kant asks the obvious question, but why are we limited only to phenomenal domain? Why can't we get to know things in themselves? And Kant gives a crazy answer, that it's all part of the divine plan, make us ethical beings. Kant says that if we were to…

…get to know things in themselves? And Kant gives a crazy answer, that it's all part of the divine plan, make us ethical beings. Kant says that if we were to know how things really are, then we would all be good, because we would see what God wants,…

…sense, not for the sake of duty. but because I don't know, I'm not stupid, I don't want to suffer, it's pure calculation, and Kant even goes a step further and says, if we human beings were to have access to things in themselves, we would turn into…

…which is a crucial term used at the same time, you know, with Heinrich von Kleist and so on. So, you know, Kant here in a beautiful way contradicts himself. The transcendental ego, this free self of self-perception for Kant, is not the nominal, as…

…so on. So, you know, Kant here in a beautiful way contradicts himself. The transcendental ego, this free self of self-perception for Kant, is not the nominal, as he sometimes claims. No, it's pure self. Of course, it's not an empirical self. You don't…

…to real world, and okay, enough of jokes, Hegel. Hegel is a notoriously, that's the rumor, difficult writer, although if you read Kant, you may have, also Kant, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and so on, you may have noticed that grammatically, Hegel is…

…of jokes, Hegel. Hegel is a notoriously, that's the rumor, difficult writer, although if you read Kant, you may have, also Kant, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and so on, you may have noticed that grammatically, Hegel is relatively easy. that grammatically…

…jokes, Hegel. Hegel is a notoriously, that's the rumor, difficult writer, although if you read Kant, you may have, also Kant, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and so on, you may have noticed that grammatically, Hegel is relatively easy. that grammatically Kant…

…also Kant, Kant, Critique of Pure Reason and so on, you may have noticed that grammatically, Hegel is relatively easy. that grammatically Kant is a nightmare, which is why as many German interpreters of Kant admit it, you, by you I mean the English…

…that grammatically, Hegel is relatively easy. that grammatically Kant is a nightmare, which is why as many German interpreters of Kant admit it, you, by you I mean the English speaking thinkers or whatever, have the luck of having excellent, especially…

…mean the English speaking thinkers or whatever, have the luck of having excellent, especially David Kemp Smith and others, translation of Kant, which are, to cut a long story short, better than the German original. You know, because Kant is like Kleist in…

…Smith and others, translation of Kant, which are, to cut a long story short, better than the German original. You know, because Kant is like Kleist in literature. His sentences are always one page, the entire page, no? And Kemp-Schmidt in a masterful way…

…at least superficially, is the opposite one. It's the famous internalization. You are guilty only for what your intention was. Like for Kant, to cut a long story short, Oedipus was innocent. He thought there is just an annoying... Okay, maybe it was not…

…is the entire thrust of Hegel's critique of Kantian antinomies, that when something is antinomic, specific sense of contradiction in Kant, it cannot Both poles of antinomy cannot be objectively true. It has to be our transcendental illusion, our misperception,…

…objectively true. It has to be our transcendental illusion, our misperception, and so on. And Hegel uses here a wonderful word that Kant shows a tenderness for the things of this world. As if, you know, let's not press too much on things. Things cannot…

…you know that? No, but I know what Haeckel is, yeah. I mean, yeah, yeah. Big part of it. So do I. And Haeckel and Kant battled disgust in matters of judgment of taste, aesthetic. Now, I will be really nasty, but don't you think that if we take the…

…you just mentioned, I will not repeat it, that for some anti-feminist, that is Ekelhaft, no? So this is maybe the deeper unity of Kant and Ekel, you know, but okay. Oh, I see. You see, she's a little bit retarded, you know. I'm retarded. For whom is…

…see, she's a little bit retarded, you know. I'm retarded. For whom is it Ekelhaft? What kind of a... What statement is that? What? Kant. No, wait a minute. I hope you got the point. I was extremely verbal. Yeah, no, you said it's Ekelhaft. No, but Kant…

…that? What? Kant. No, wait a minute. I hope you got the point. I was extremely verbal. Yeah, no, you said it's Ekelhaft. No, but Kant is Ekelhaft. Yeah, how dare you? Kant in the sense of, yeah. I got it. Believe me, I got it. You got it, okay. And…

…I hope you got the point. I was extremely verbal. Yeah, no, you said it's Ekelhaft. No, but Kant is Ekelhaft. Yeah, how dare you? Kant in the sense of, yeah. I got it. Believe me, I got it. You got it, okay. And you're going to get it. Yeah, okay.…

…that she wants to Kantianize Hegel to make him too much of a simple Enlightenment guy. Although, didn't you write a book on Kant or whatever? No, sorry. I'm confusing you. Ah, with you. Yeah, yeah. Now I will be a white male chauvinist racist. Who…

…so on, he does the exact opposite of what? Now, next point that you should know, and I agree, is that it's not only Kant against Hegel. The gap is already in Kant himself. Kant is a much more, you know, almost it sounds sometimes when you read this…

…what? Now, next point that you should know, and I agree, is that it's not only Kant against Hegel. The gap is already in Kant himself. Kant is a much more, you know, almost it sounds sometimes when you read this naive enlightenment guys as if Kant was…

…next point that you should know, and I agree, is that it's not only Kant against Hegel. The gap is already in Kant himself. Kant is a much more, you know, almost it sounds sometimes when you read this naive enlightenment guys as if Kant was still a…

…himself. Kant is a much more, you know, almost it sounds sometimes when you read this naive enlightenment guys as if Kant was still a good guy clear benevolent enlightenment and then this crazy dark obscure metaphysician Schelling Hegel comment no no with…

…Kant was still a good guy clear benevolent enlightenment and then this crazy dark obscure metaphysician Schelling Hegel comment no no with Kant already but I don't have time to do this of course today things are much more complex another example of this…

…He comes out, he's just burned here and so on, you know, this art wellness. I think, again, that Lacan, in his reading of Kant with Sade, points out how you find the same mystery in Sade. The victims in Sade, Norris of Marquis de Sade, are tortured…

…of his most famous seminars, Seminar 7, translated for a long time, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, there, Lacan developed his notions of Kant with Satan, and also of this relationship between law and desire. And at the very end of the seminar, he says,…

…the psychoanalytic categorical imperative. And that's where he sees the connection between Kantian ethics and Sartre. The point is not that Kant is a saint. the law, whatever it means, blah, blah, that, you know, just think about, for example, a severe…

…you, bombards you with horrible demands, but at the same time sadistically enjoys your failure, no? So Lacan's point is not that Kant is a sadist, but a much more difficult subtle one, that Marquis de Sade was already a Kantian. In what sense? First,…

…one, take two dogs, two women, and one man. You know, you lose. So, as Lacan notes it intelligently, in so far as for Kant, the basic point is that the proper ethics should be without paths. You shouldn't enjoy, you know, but it should be purely called…

…point is that the proper ethics should be without paths. You shouldn't enjoy, you know, but it should be purely called mechanical, as Kant put it You should do it for the sake of duty. Even if you do the right thing, but you find some satisfaction…

…who I don't like very much, he was the father of fascism in aesthetics, but he wrote a nice short poem making fun of Kant, where he describes a good woman who does something nice to her, to foreign children, but then she complains, but what can I do?…

…apathetic. It's a kind of a really 50 shades. great. Totally. And then you have another element which is so important where Kant really, sorry, Saab really becomes question to what extent, but there is a certain development in Saab, to what extent you can…

…the Pope gives a long explanation of the southern system, when he describes this, it's shocking to what extent exact terms that Kant uses for an ethical act. That it shouldn't be done for any pleasure and especially, you know, for Kant, ethical act is…

…exact terms that Kant uses for an ethical act. That it shouldn't be done for any pleasure and especially, you know, for Kant, ethical act is a free act. Why? Because it's no longer part of what Kant calls pathological motivations. For Kant, pathological…

…pleasure and especially, you know, for Kant, ethical act is a free act. Why? Because it's no longer part of what Kant calls pathological motivations. For Kant, pathological means motivated by empirical, factual reasons. For example, if you do something for a…

…for Kant, ethical act is a free act. Why? Because it's no longer part of what Kant calls pathological motivations. For Kant, pathological means motivated by empirical, factual reasons. For example, if you do something for a certain empirical cause, to gain,…

…pathological. A free act is done just for the sake of it. But Sade defines in the very same terms If you read Kant through this insight, you discover wonders. You do not discover only the obvious links or hints which point and serve. For example, you…

…is the contract. Oh my God, she looked back now. The contract about sacred union, children, or whatever, you know. So, now Levine Kant is joking there. Look at the next page, my favorite in all Kant, where Kant asks, if a man runs away from his…

…about sacred union, children, or whatever, you know. So, now Levine Kant is joking there. Look at the next page, my favorite in all Kant, where Kant asks, if a man runs away from his wife, does she have the right says yes, but not for any spiritual…

…union, children, or whatever, you know. So, now Levine Kant is joking there. Look at the next page, my favorite in all Kant, where Kant asks, if a man runs away from his wife, does she have the right says yes, but not for any spiritual reason, because…

…which belongs to me, which is reserved for my use. So come One of the... I more and more admire two late books by Kant. One is, of course, his Anthropology, where you discover a Kant which is uncannily close to Pascal. Not the Kant of this inner…

…One of the... I more and more admire two late books by Kant. One is, of course, his Anthropology, where you discover a Kant which is uncannily close to Pascal. Not the Kant of this inner ethics, but precisely the Kant of explanation. Fake it till you…

…late books by Kant. One is, of course, his Anthropology, where you discover a Kant which is uncannily close to Pascal. Not the Kant of this inner ethics, but precisely the Kant of explanation. Fake it till you make it. You know, Kant says, if you are…

…his Anthropology, where you discover a Kant which is uncannily close to Pascal. Not the Kant of this inner ethics, but precisely the Kant of explanation. Fake it till you make it. You know, Kant says, if you are immoral, act as if, imitate and There is…

…close to Pascal. Not the Kant of this inner ethics, but precisely the Kant of explanation. Fake it till you make it. You know, Kant says, if you are immoral, act as if, imitate and There is hope that you will fall into your own trap and really become…

…as if, imitate and There is hope that you will fall into your own trap and really become moral. But the other Kant, religion within the limits of reason alone. Where Kant briefly entertains the notion of radical evil. No, that's the whole point. First,…

…will fall into your own trap and really become moral. But the other Kant, religion within the limits of reason alone. Where Kant briefly entertains the notion of radical evil. No, that's the whole point. First, he plays with the notion of what he calls…

…want to apologize. He said, no, I did it, why? Because I wanted to do it. absolutely insisted on... So, you see my point. Kant is afraid then to admit this, that if you define moral act as a non-pathological act, as act of following a universal rule,…

…and so on and so on. Schelling also develops an idea which is, I think, extremely important. This idea which you already find in Kant of how we are responsible for our character, as it were. We do something which may appear that we do it because of…

…I would say, no, I think you find, yeah, yeah, a mega great philosopher, I agree, all of this. But no, I am on the Kant. Insofar as the great choice is Kant versus Spinoza, I am for Kant. This is why I admire some of Althusser's followers who began…

…yeah, a mega great philosopher, I agree, all of this. But no, I am on the Kant. Insofar as the great choice is Kant versus Spinoza, I am for Kant. This is why I admire some of Althusser's followers who began as fanatical anti-Hebelians and then broke…

…agree, all of this. But no, I am on the Kant. Insofar as the great choice is Kant versus Spinoza, I am for Kant. This is why I admire some of Althusser's followers who began as fanatical anti-Hebelians and then broke down. For example, Pierre Macherec,…

…Namely, one of the greatest breaks in maybe the entire history of philosophy is the Kantian break. You know, Immanuel Kant introduced the notion of transcendental dimension, which means what? It means that, again, we don't have direct access to mediated,…

…but you cannot then drop fictions and keep only reality. If you erase fictions, you lose reality also. So, transcendental, what Kant calls transcendental dimension is this type of unconscious notional network. You are not even aware of it, but it's always…

…death drive, for example, as in Tristan and Isolde, the night of the world, the end of all, and so on and so on. Kant himself also had a presentiment of this when he develops in his writings of education. They are wonderful. He says that there he…

…as a masturbatory partner. toy and so on and so on and this is from the beginning in modern philosophy you remember Immanuel Kant in his metaphysics of Morse provided a definition of marriage which is the best that I know which shocked Hegel and all of…

…a contract between two adult people of the mutual use of their sex organs for pleasure. No bullshit about spiritual youth. And Kant means it seriously. And this is the Kant that I love. Look one page later when, quite seriously, he debates the…

…mutual use of their sex organs for pleasure. No bullshit about spiritual youth. And Kant means it seriously. And this is the Kant that I love. Look one page later when, quite seriously, he debates the consequences of this definition of marriage. And he…

…if I am married to a lady and I run away, Does the lady have the right to call a policeman to bring me back? Kant says, yes, but because I ran away with something that is part her property, my penis, because I signed the contract with her, you know.…

…because I signed the contract with her, you know. So what I'm saying that this structure, masturbatory structure, is already there in Kant, so then Can we still save authentic love, romance, and so on? I think we can. How? The Guardian magazine, but I…

…yes, but I have other points about Nietzsche. But I wanted to say Descartes also decided to write in French. And when Kant decided to write in German, all these Frauengesellschaften or women's societies started reading Kant instead of the Bible. This was a…

…to write in French. And when Kant decided to write in German, all these Frauengesellschaften or women's societies started reading Kant instead of the Bible. This was a big scandal. But Descartes' decision to write in French meant opening up philosophy…

…he... refers just to the sense of ethical duty, which makes you free, in a way which, of course, points forward towards Kant. But the advantage of Kut is that, for him, freedom is also social and economic, radical freedom. There is no slavery. radical…

…local tyrant there to reconstruct his state in this sense. They practically all wanted to change the world. Spinoza has a project. Kant has a project. All. All philosophers had a project how to change the world. Now I will become really evil. Except one.…

…that neither Hegel nor Rosencrantz followed this path, another way would have been the sublime. in the sense of, you know, in Kant, you know his theory of the sublime, something monstrous, excessive, but in a negative way it points out the beauty or not…

…be sure that it will turn around into sublime or comical? What if it's simply too strong and it remains monstrous? Even Kant allows for this option. When Kant says that sublime only works... a monstrous phenomenon engenders sublime effect if we are safe,…

…into sublime or comical? What if it's simply too strong and it remains monstrous? Even Kant allows for this option. When Kant says that sublime only works... a monstrous phenomenon engenders sublime effect if we are safe, from a safe position. Like, storm…

…Like, storm is sublime if you observe it through a window, not if you are in the middle there, directly threatened. And then Kant does something incredible. And I'm sorry I talked so much, so fuck it with this. I will end, but we go on tomorrow.…

…something incredible. And I'm sorry I talked so much, so fuck it with this. I will end, but we go on tomorrow. Kant distinguishes here colossal from the monstrous. Colossal is this, two great monstrous which still engenders the effect of sublime. But if…

…effect of sublime. But if monstrous gets too strong, then we just get some total terror, total unpleasure. And it's incredible what Kant does here. He directly, I couldn't believe it, so maybe Lacan was not totally idiot, he directly uses the couple lust,…

…sublime pleasure and so on. But he says when monstrous gets to monstrous, it's not pleasure, but, my God, it's... Ah, you see, Kant says, wo in this experience of pleasure the lust zugleich kultur is. Where? Pleasure is at the same time culture. But he…

…know. But I think it's perfect. For me, at least. The greatest contribution of America, United States, to world culture. So-called Kant laughter, you know. The TV set, those stupid American series like Cheers, Friends, where the TV... laughs for you laughter…

…to change the world. Plato, you know his miserable excursion to Syracuse, trying to convince the tyrant, up to Fichte and so on, Kant, project for eternal peace, and so on and so on. Now I come to my paradox. There is probably only one philosopher who…

…very intersubjective communication. Here, I think things get problematic. Why? Because although Habermas perceives himself as the great follower of Kant, He obviously didn't do his homework in reading Kant. Only now am I discovering maybe the most, this is…

…Why? Because although Habermas perceives himself as the great follower of Kant, He obviously didn't do his homework in reading Kant. Only now am I discovering maybe the most, this is also self-criticism, the most interesting Kant, the late Kant of…

…do his homework in reading Kant. Only now am I discovering maybe the most, this is also self-criticism, the most interesting Kant, the late Kant of his anthropology, anthropological writings. What Kant does there is precisely, we really find a kind of a…

…reading Kant. Only now am I discovering maybe the most, this is also self-criticism, the most interesting Kant, the late Kant of his anthropology, anthropological writings. What Kant does there is precisely, we really find a kind of a Pascalian, Althusserian…

…maybe the most, this is also self-criticism, the most interesting Kant, the late Kant of his anthropology, anthropological writings. What Kant does there is precisely, we really find a kind of a Pascalian, Althusserian Kant there. total contrast to what we…

…his anthropology, anthropological writings. What Kant does there is precisely, we really find a kind of a Pascalian, Althusserian Kant there. total contrast to what we officially perceive as Kantian philosophy, which is, you know, this inner sincerity,…

…gain and so on, only if you did it only for the sake of duty. But here we found a much more pragmatic Kant, not pragmatic in the sense of taking into account circumstances, but precisely pragmatic in the sense of how does all this normativity involved…

…precisely pragmatic in the sense of how does all this normativity involved in symbolic communication work in actual life? And Kant concludes or presents a great celebration for hypocrisy, insincerity, and so on. You know, it's almost elaborated in detail the…

…I'm deceiving you, but ultimately I will deceive myself. And I mean, I've been starting to believe my own illusion. And then Kant goes here into such wonderful detail when you can lie against all the big Kantian motto, you know, under no circumstances you…

…of lying, of how the only way to do it is to begin by lying. A celebration of faking, of... All that stuff. What does Kant know here? Something which was in an incredibly ingenious way, I claim, indicated by my God, if there is a thing for which I…

…Habermas. You know, for all this obscenity, lying, and so on, not as a simple cheating, but in its positive role. And again, Kant was fully aware of it. He talks about jokes, gallantry, and so on. And again, it's a big celebration of faking. And with…

…complex, but the basic lesson of Bologna, the basic idea of Bologna reform is precisely to get rid of what already Immanuel Kant called Public use of reason, which is very interesting philosophically. For Kant, public use of reason is not when you speak…

…reform is precisely to get rid of what already Immanuel Kant called Public use of reason, which is very interesting philosophically. For Kant, public use of reason is not when you speak publicly. Public use of reason is when you... Reason, in a way which…

…not when you speak publicly. Public use of reason is when you... Reason, in a way which is not constrained by what Kant calls private goals, but for Kant, state is, in this sense, a private institution. For Kant, theology, law, faculty, this is private…

…use of reason is when you... Reason, in a way which is not constrained by what Kant calls private goals, but for Kant, state is, in this sense, a private institution. For Kant, theology, law, faculty, this is private use of reason. Because, you know,…

…which is not constrained by what Kant calls private goals, but for Kant, state is, in this sense, a private institution. For Kant, theology, law, faculty, this is private use of reason. Because, you know, you have a certain frame determined in advance. For…

…For Kant, theology, law, faculty, this is private use of reason. Because, you know, you have a certain frame determined in advance. For Kant, philosophy and pure science are public use of reason. So it's a wonderful idea. If a couple of us meet in a…

…domain of let's call it naivny radical negativity emerges. And that's the problem. You know who already knew this in a way? Kant even. You know in his wonderful short writing Über Erziehung. He provides his famous definition of man is an animal who needs…

…animal who needs a master. And then he says why. Not because we must need a master to control our natural instincts. But Kant speaks about some kind of a radical, madly free unruliness which is typical to man and which is kind of metaphysical unruliness.…

…itself directly serves as a remote control machine. When this happens then, in the terms of German idealism, We enter what Kant called intellectual intuition, the closing of the gap between mind and reality, a mind process which, in a causal way, directly…

…intuition, the closing of the gap between mind and reality, a mind process which, in a causal way, directly influences reality. For Kant, who insisted on human finitude, only this is the definition of the divine, infinite God. We humans, we live in a gap…

…between inside and outside. God thinks about something, he can directly actualize it. But the problem is that, as we learned from Kant, as well as from Freud, this gap of finitude is at the same time the resource of our creativity. The distance between…

…more, not how First, it was an authentic experience, then it gets corrupted. But how? And you will see, this is what Kant is talking about, surprisingly, as something which, again, can begin as undoubtedly corrupted and so on, or just means of ideological…

…are. Looks bad. Okay. I will then just try to recapitulate what I'm saying. First, I really advise you to read this Kant. For a long time, Immanuel Kant, and I'm not now changing the terrain, because this materiality of the signifier In tradition,…

…just try to recapitulate what I'm saying. First, I really advise you to read this Kant. For a long time, Immanuel Kant, and I'm not now changing the terrain, because this materiality of the signifier In tradition, philosophical, our Western tradition, I…

…and so on. So, we have critique of pure, we have ethics. Then, under the pretext of just anthropology, anthropology is for Kant, ethics, but ethics like applied to real empirical life, to humans as empirical objects. How does it function there? My God,…

…he was the first to emphasize the key position of this text. He is too short. He simply uses it as a proof that Kant is caught into what he calls already in his The Order of Thing, the transcendental empirical duality doublet. Kant is forced to observe…

…that Kant is caught into what he calls already in his The Order of Thing, the transcendental empirical duality doublet. Kant is forced to observe human beings from two perspectives, as transcendental, pure, free subjects, and as empirical, natural entities.…

…is forced to observe human beings from two perspectives, as transcendental, pure, free subjects, and as empirical, natural entities. And how Kant is not able to bring the two together. So that Kant has to oscillates between the two without being able to…

…as transcendental, pure, free subjects, and as empirical, natural entities. And how Kant is not able to bring the two together. So that Kant has to oscillates between the two without being able to really reduce one to the other. Of course Kant is not a…

…So that Kant has to oscillates between the two without being able to really reduce one to the other. Of course Kant is not a naturalist so he's forbidden to translate transcendental subject into empirical history, how it emerged out of nature, but…

…forbidden to translate transcendental subject into empirical history, how it emerged out of nature, but also the opposite one. Like Kant admitted that we are caught in concrete social circumstances, you cannot develop this out of pure practical reason, out of…

…remains at this level, just tension between transcendental and empirical. But what Foucault doesn't get is that the domain that Kant develops here in anthropology is, of course, it's not pure reason. It's empirical circumstances. But it's also not empirical…

…also not empirical in the sense of facts. It's precisely what we today would have called performative dimension of social interaction. Kant is obsessed, he develops his details by the idea that although at a transcendental level you are free as a…

…But nonetheless, empirically, in social life, for us to become moral, social rules, etiquette, condition you to this. But here Kant knows better than Althusser that these social rules are not simply empirical rules. He, Kant, is not talking simply about…

…you to this. But here Kant knows better than Althusser that these social rules are not simply empirical rules. He, Kant, is not talking simply about empirical training. He talks precisely about... moral appearance. He endorses fully something that in his…

…For example, one in the subdivisions of his anthropology sub-chapters is called on permissible moral appearance, shine appearance. What Kant is developing in all possible ways is that precisely this motive that Althusser repeats all the time following Pascal,…

…moral even if you are not? The traditional position would be this is the most disgusting thing. You just pretend to be moral. But Kant again and again tries to develop how the only way to morality is that you begin by acting as if you are moral. And…

…And then there is a hope that you will fall into your own trap. Let me just read you nonetheless a little bit of Kant here. On the whole, the more civilized human beings are, the more they are actors. They adopt the illusion of affections, of respect…

…appearance that instills respect for others and so on and so on. So, okay, I will not go too far, but you see what Kant is here wonderfully saying, that the logic of morality is you should begin by deceiving others, in the sense of I'm really evil,…

…moral. So he praises here empty coquetry, gallantry, and so on and so on, endlessly. What is so interesting here is that Kant is here discovering a domain which is neither the domain of pure inner morality, like looking to the inside out, or external…

…moral, they are also not prohibited by the law, cheating a little bit, and so on and so on. So my point is that what Kant does is... open up a domain of things, and the whole point is that they have to exist, namely things which only are operative…

…as your... Politeness which, again, even if you are expected to obey it, it must appear as if you freely obey it. So again, Kant discovers here a domain which is really a subversive one, and I think, but I don't have time to develop it now, I think…

…I lied. We got her. No, sorry. What I want to say immediately, I'm sorry. What I wanted to say is that... Also Kant says here some very interesting thing about domination, servitude, and so on, where he said that the same goes for domination and…

…choosing to be your servant or whatever. A weird intermediate domain idea. A weird intermediate domain emerges here. So again, what Kant sees here is that this Pascal formula, you know, Pascalian formula, bless Pascal, when he says, you know, the famous…

…entire lecture telling us the bits that Althusser didn't see. After? That Althusser didn't see, and then you finish very briefly on Kant by pointing out that Kant did appreciate the materiality of appearances that had to be done. And then I thought, oh my…

…bits that Althusser didn't see. After? That Althusser didn't see, and then you finish very briefly on Kant by pointing out that Kant did appreciate the materiality of appearances that had to be done. And then I thought, oh my god, that means that, you…

…actually have to be, you cannot be told to do it. So even when you're pretending, because you're... How do we all become Kant, basically? How do we find a space of freedom that Kant appreciated and Arthur XIII didn't appreciate? How do we find that…

…So even when you're pretending, because you're... How do we all become Kant, basically? How do we find a space of freedom that Kant appreciated and Arthur XIII didn't appreciate? How do we find that domain of freedom if we are no Kant or even Kantian? I…

…space of freedom that Kant appreciated and Arthur XIII didn't appreciate? How do we find that domain of freedom if we are no Kant or even Kantian? I mean, what if... But why not? Sorry, it won't change. My point would be very naive that we practically…

…precisely... Okay, we can go into it. I'm not sure it really works like that. Because I think that precisely what in Kant you don't find, again, is this superego dimension of eternal self-questioning. You know, like, is this the right way to do? Should…

…the smooth cooperation between their state agencies say their academy of sciences and private capital In short, both branches of what Kant called the private use of reason, state and capital, joined hands at the expense of the absent public use of reason,…

…was still that even the, let's call them, tolerant liberal Anglo-Saxons... They were ready to concede maybe there is something in Kant, maybe here, there, but not Hegel. Hegel is the point of complete madness. Madness in this ridiculous sense, you know, the…

…sense that it was not a misunderstanding it's clear Aristotle totally misunderstood Plato or later it's clear that Fichte misunderstood Kant Hegel misunderstood everyone Marx misunderstood Hegel and so on I don't believe in dialogue if dialogue works means I…

…comical, easier, and so on. Well, he didn't do his homework there. First, Lacan, I remember, has long pages on how already Kant knew that there is always something comical in the demand of the superego, but Lacan knew something more, that this comical…

…the goal of this reform and all pressures connected with it is a very precise and can be put in the terms of Immanuel Kant when he opposes public use of reason, I think the German term is and private use of reason. You know the paradox. For Kant,…

…Kant when he opposes public use of reason, I think the German term is and private use of reason. You know the paradox. For Kant, public use of reason is not a working for the state, for community. This is for Kant precisely private use of reason. When…

…reason. You know the paradox. For Kant, public use of reason is not a working for the state, for community. This is for Kant precisely private use of reason. When your reason is in advance limited by tasks, problems decided by others. While in public use…

…self-destructive. It's not... civilization, symbolic fictions, duties, but it's also not nature. You know who was nicely aware of this? Immanuel Kant. In a tiny text which is half forgotten today on education. Kant, it's there that Kant says this weird thing…

…also not nature. You know who was nicely aware of this? Immanuel Kant. In a tiny text which is half forgotten today on education. Kant, it's there that Kant says this weird thing that I like, famous definition of what is man. Man is an animal who needs…

…who was nicely aware of this? Immanuel Kant. In a tiny text which is half forgotten today on education. Kant, it's there that Kant says this weird thing that I like, famous definition of what is man. Man is an animal who needs an answer. Sorry, mystical…

…of what is man. Man is an animal who needs an answer. Sorry, mystical Freudian slip, who needs a master. But in how does Kant ground that? He says that only in man there is a kind of a violent freedom, a kind of a brutal freedom, freedom which…

…paradox when he deployed his notion of enthusiasm apropos the French Revolution in his late writing, Conflict of Faculties. According to Kant, the French Revolution's true significance does not reside in what actually went on in Paris, much of which Kant was…

…According to Kant, the French Revolution's true significance does not reside in what actually went on in Paris, much of which Kant was the first to concede was terrifying and included outbursts of murderous passion, but in the enthusiastic response that the…

…the enthusiastic response that the events in Paris generated in the eyes of sympathetic observers all around Europe. A quote from Kant. The recent revolution of a people which is rich in spirit may well either fail or succeed, accumulate misery and…

…the Western admirers of the Soviet Union? The Soviet experience of building socialism in one country certainly did, to quote Kant, accumulate misery and atrocity, but it nevertheless aroused enthusiasm in the heart of the spectators who were not themselves…

…is humanism. It's this celebrating the fullness of personality and so on. But the lesson of all radical modern philosophers, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, is no. The wealth of our personality is just a mask. There is a void there. And this void, okay,…

…think left, it goes left. Now, if we say this is wonderful, we are becoming like gods, literally, because if you know Kant, this is what Kant called intellectual intuition, We humans, as finite, endless beings, we think reality is out there, that we're…

…left. Now, if we say this is wonderful, we are becoming like gods, literally, because if you know Kant, this is what Kant called intellectual intuition, We humans, as finite, endless beings, we think reality is out there, that we're into it. But Kant…

…Kant called intellectual intuition, We humans, as finite, endless beings, we think reality is out there, that we're into it. But Kant says, only for God, thinking is creating. Thinking is immediately also physical causality. Here we get almost the taste of…

…imminent part. Then, even historically, And this idea incidentally persists. You find it in Descartes, you find it in Kant. You know, Kant's fundamental experience was Swedenborg's mysticism. Swedenborg was Kant's madman. And the whole Kant's criticism was…

…Kant's fundamental experience was Swedenborg's mysticism. Swedenborg was Kant's madman. And the whole Kant's criticism was madness for Kant Because idealism where you project ideas onto reality. It's a kind of not transcendental idealism but the substantial…